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NEPA—Substantive Effectiveness 
Under a Procedural Mandate: 
Assessment of Oil and Gas 
EISs in the Mountain West
John Ruple* and Mark Capone**
select the least environmentally damaging alternative, but, 
rather, to take a “hard look” at the environmental impacts 
of alternative courses of action before making a decision.3 
Indeed, “[i]f the adverse environmental effects of the pro-
posed action are adequately identified and evaluated, the 
agency is not constrained by NEPA from deciding that other 
values outweigh the environmental costs.”4
Because NEPA is a procedural law, scholars have focused 
primarily on assessing procedural efficiencies in the deci-
sion-making process.5 Accordingly, as the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (“GAO”) recently noted, “[i]nforma-
tion on the benefits of completing NEPA analyses is largely 
qualitative.”6 Moreover, as the GAO explained, “agency 
activities under NEPA are hard to separate from other envi-
ronmental review tasks under federal laws, such as the Clean 
Water Act7 and the Endangered Species Act;8 executive 
orders; agency guidance; and state and local laws.”9
While there is little scholarship testing NEPA’s substan-
tive effectiveness, there is a growing body of research con-
ducted on NEPA analogs in other countries.10 More than 
100 countries have emulated NEPA and require some sort 
of environmental assessment process for certain projects.11 
Consequently, a number of studies have evaluated the sub-
3. Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 374 (1989).
4. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989).
5. Daniel R. Mandelker, NEPA Law and Litigation § 11:1 (2d ed. 2014).
6. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-14-370, National Environ-
mental Policy Act: Little Information Exists on NEPA Analyses 11 
(2014); see also Mandelker, supra note 5.
7. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as 
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012)).
8. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as 
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012)).
9. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 6 (internal citations added).
10. Mathew Cashmore et al., The Interminable Issue of Effectiveness: Substantive 
Purposes, Outcomes and Research Challenges in the Advancement of Environmen-
tal Impact Assessment Theory, 22 Envtl. Assessment & Project Appraisal 
295, 299–301 (2004).
11. Mathew Cashmore et al., The Role and Functioning of Environment Assessment: 
Theoretical Reflections Upon an Empirical Investigation of Causation, 88 J. En-
vtl. Mgmt. 1233, 1233 (2008).
I. Introduction
A. Project Overview
This Article empirically evaluates whether the National 
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”)1 is effective in reducing 
environmental impacts for oil and natural gas development 
projects. “Effectiveness” is defined here as a significant reduc-
tion in impacts anticipated between the initial proposal and 
the project as approved following completion of an Environ-
mental Impact Statement (“EIS”).
NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare an environ-
mental statement for “major Federal actions significantly 
affecting the quality of the human environment.”2 NEPA’s 
procedural mandate does not require federal agencies to 
1. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 
(1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2012)).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
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stantive effectiveness of these other environmental assessment 
processes.12 Cashmore et al. (2004), in summarizing these 
studies, found that it was difficult to generalize regarding the 
substantive effect of environmental assessments because of 
“differences in research methodologies, varying interpreta-
tions of [substantive effectiveness], and  .  .  . restricted geo-
graphical spread  .  .  .  .”13 However, the studies reviewed in 
Cashmore et al. (2004) indicated that environmental assess-
ments did result in moderate project modifications, usually 
accomplished through “fine tuning” of project proposals to 
mitigate for or avoid environmental impacts.14 We suspect 
that EISs provide similar benefits by “fine tuning” major fed-
eral actions.
This Article advances the debate over NEPA’s benefits 
and what, if any, NEPA reforms would be most valuable. 
This research is timely because multiple pending bills before 
Congress propose to “streamline” NEPA by limiting public 
comment opportunities, limiting the scope of alternatives 
analyzed, limiting the depth of review, accelerating the time-
line for NEPA analysis, or limiting administrative or judicial 
review.15 Understanding whether NEPA leads to less impact-
ful decisions or fewer constrains on economic activity are 
important factors in weighing the merits of these proposals.
B. NEPA Overview
NEPA is described as the Magna Carta of environmental 
laws16 and has inspired numerous countries to adopt their 
own NEPA analogues.17 NEPA declares that it is a national 
policy to “encourage productive and enjoyable harmony 
between man and his environment; to promote efforts which 
will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and 
biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; [and] 
to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and 
natural resources important to the Nation.  .  .  .”18 NEPA’s 
lofty policy goals are met through a procedural requirement 
that federal agencies identify and analyze impacts on the 
environment prior to taking, authorizing, or funding major 
federal actions.19 Careful consideration, it is believed, will 
lead to better environmental outcomes.
Under NEPA, “major federal actions significantly affect-
ing the quality of the human environment” must undergo an 
environmental review prior to federal authorization or fund-
12. Cashmore et al., supra note 10, at 300–01.
13. Id. at 299.
14. Id. at 299, 302.
15. See, e.g., H.R. 2647, 114th Cong. (2015) (expediting NEPA for forest and 
timber management activities); S. 468, 114th Cong. (2015) (categorically ex-
cluding certain vegetation treatments from NEPA analysis); H.R. 348, 113th 
Cong. (2015) (establishing procedures to streamline the regulatory review, en-
vironmental decisionmaking, and permitting process for construction activi-
ties undertaken, reviewed, or funded by federal agencies); H.R. 1616, 114th 
Cong. (2015) (creating categorical exclusions for certain natural gas develop-
ment related activities); H.R. 1792, 114th Cong. (2015) (delegating to the 
states NEPA compliance responsibilities for livestock grazing authorizations).
16. Mandelker, supra note 5, § 1:1.
17. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Manag-
ing Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 903, 905 
(2002).
18. 43 U.S.C. § 4321 (2012).
19. Id. § 4332(2)(C) (2012).
ing.20 When a major federal project’s impacts are known to 
be significant, compliance requires completion of an EIS.21 
Completion of an EIS can take several years and cost mil-
lions of dollars.22 While EISs are required for less than 1% 
of projects evaluated under NEPA,23 EISs receive more atten-
tion than less extensive compliance documents because they 
involve “high-profile, complex, and expensive” projects.24
EISs are prepared in stages. At the outset of the NEPA 
process, the lead agency publishes a Notice of Intent to 
Prepare an EIS (“NOI”) in the Federal Register.25 The NOI 
describes the action contemplated and invites public com-
ment. After receiving and considering public comment, the 
lead agency prepares a draft EIS analyzing the direct, indi-
rect, and cumulative impacts of the proposed action, along 
with alternative means of achieving the purpose and need 
for the proposed action.26 The public is invited to review the 
draft EIS and provide comments, which the agency reviews 
and considers, responding as appropriate and revising the 
NEPA document as needed before issuing the final EIS.27
If significant deficiencies are identified, the lead agency 
may prepare and release a revised draft EIS or a supplemen-
tal EIS.28 The NEPA process concludes with publication of a 
Record of Decision (“ROD”) documenting the agency’s final 
decision.29 The public is then provided an opportunity to 
review the ROD and pursue either an administrative appeal 
or litigation.30
Because environmental impacts are normally quantified 
at each phase of the NEPA process, evaluation of iterative 
changes between each phase may provide an indicator of the 
benefits obtained from NEPA review. Significant environ-
mental impact reductions would indicate NEPA efficacy, and 
whether impacts that are subject to regulation independent 
of NEPA are reduced more rapidly than those that are not 
regulated independently, may provide insight into the under-
lying cause of impact reductions.
II. Methods
In designing this project, we sought to answer several ques-
tions: (1) Are final NEPA decisions likely to have lower envi-
ronmental impacts than the initial proposal? (2) What are 
the economic implications of impact reductions? (3) If itera-
tive changes occurring through the NEPA process lead to a 
less impactful project, at what stage in the process do most 
20. Id.
21. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.3 (2014).
22. U.S Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 6, at 13–15; Piet deWitt & 
Carole A. deWitt, Preparation Times for Final Environmental Impact Statements 
Made Available From 2007 Through 2010, 10 Envtl. Prac. 123, 125 (2013) 
[hereinafter deWitt & deWitt, Preparation Time]; Piet deWitt & Carole A. 
deWitt, How Long Does It Take to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement?, 
10 Envtl. Prac. 164, 168 (2008) [hereinafter deWitt & deWitt, How Long 
Does It Take?].
23. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 6, at 8.
24. Id.
25. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.7, 1508.22 (2014).
26. Id. §§ 1502.14–1502.16 (2014).
27. Id. §§ 1503.1, 1503.4 (2014).
28. Id. § 1502.9(a), (c) (2014).
29. Id. § 1505.2 (2014).
30. Id. § 1505.1 (2014).
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reductions occur? (4) Is that reduction attributable to NEPA, 
intervening factors, or a combination of both? (5) Is there a 
relationship between the number of alternatives considered 
in an EIS and the amount of environmental impact reduc-
tion that occurred through the NEPA process?
Answering these questions is complicated by the tremen-
dous variability in NEPA content, making comparison across 
projects difficult. This difficulty is a reflection of the breadth 
of projects subject to NEPA. NEPA’s implementing regula-
tions also, necessarily, avoid one-size-fits-all disclosures in 
favor of an analysis that is meaningful in the context of each 
proposed action. NEPA regulations, therefore, direct agen-
cies to “identify significant environmental issues deserving 
of study . . . [and] deemphasize insignificant issues, narrow-
ing the scope of the environmental impact statement pro-
cess accordingly.”31 Because the NEPA process is intended 
to be flexible enough to address diverse local conditions and 
issues, NEPA documents may also measure or model similar 
impacts in different ways. One NEPA document may, for 
example, disclose direct employment impacts by year, while 
another may combine direct and indirect employment into a 
single value disclosed for the life of the project.32 While both 
approaches are consistent with NEPA’s objectives, this lack of 
uniformity can complicate efforts to compare projects.
In testing the efficacy of NEPA, the conducted research 
focused on EISs because of their iterative approach, the exten-
sive analysis and documentation they contain, the impor-
tance of the decisions they consider, the time and expense 
involved in EIS preparation, and the controversy often sur-
rounding the projects that require the submission of an EIS. 
To maximize consistency of impact measures, we focused 
our analysis on EISs for oil, natural gas, or coalbed methane 
(collectively “O&G”) development authorized by the U.S. 
Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) and occurring in 
Colorado, Montana, Utah, or Wyoming (n=13). Including 
draft, final, and supplemental EISs, these projects produced a 
total of forty records. This Article focused on O&G projects 
because they involve discrete and easily quantifiable impacts, 
such as the acres of surface disturbance, the miles of road and 
pipeline constructed, and the number of wells drilled. These 
four states were chosen because the large amount of federally 
managed public lands in this area results in a higher number 
of recently completed EISs for O&G projects than was found 
in other regions.
EISs satisfying the selection criteria were identified by 
using the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s EIS Data-
base.33 Database coverage begins in January 2004, which 
provides the starting point for our analysis. We considered 
all NEPA projects completed (projects which resulted in the 
publication of a ROD) through October 2014. Even with this 
narrow scope, there was a great deal of variability between 
EISs, apparently driven by local conditions and concerns, as 
well as by differences, in field office procedure.
31. Id. § 1500.4(g) (2014).
32. Id. § 1508.25(c) (2014).
33. Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) Database, U.S. Envtl. Protection 
Agency, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/nepa/eisdata.html (last visited Aug. 
3, 2015).
We obtained and reviewed every NOI, draft EIS, final EIS, 
supplemental EIS (if any), and ROD for each project meet-
ing our selection requirements. Impact metrics associated 
with the proposed action in the draft EIS, preferred alter-
natives in the final EIS, and agency decisions contained in 
the ROD were recorded. Consistent with deWitt and deWitt 
(2008), we also recorded document release dates,34 as well as 
the number of alternatives considered in each document. A 
complete set of the impact metrics that were identified and 
recorded is listed in Table 1. Metrics shown in italics failed to 
meet minimum sample size requirements and were not car-
ried forward for statistical analysis. We initially speculated 
that NOIs might contain key indicators, such as the number 
of wells proposed, hence providing an additional data point, 
but there was insufficient information available to make most 
NOIs a meaningful indicator of anticipated project impact 
or benefit.
Statistical analysis was limited to variables that were 
reported in at least eight of the thirteen EISs. Where nec-
essary to facilitate comparison and meet minimum sample 
size requirements, agency-provided data was converted into a 
consistent metric. As an example, some EISs calculated water 
use per year and others calculated water use for the life of the 
project. To create a common metric, we converted water use 
per year to water use for the life of the project by multiplying 
yearly water use by the agency’s estimated project life.
Economic measures (hydrocarbon production, jobs cre-
ated, and tax revenue generated) were reported with less con-
sistency than environmental measures, creating a challenge 
to capturing NEPA’s economic consequences. Hydrocarbon 
production, for example, represents an obvious indicator of 
commodity production. However, only three EISs estimated 
natural gas extraction, only four EISs estimated both gas 
and oil extraction, and five EISs did not estimate oil or gas 
extraction at all. We attempted to overcome this problem 
by converting volumetric O&G extraction data into British 
thermal units. However, even with this conversion, we failed 
to satisfy our minimum sample size requirements, prevent-
ing us from effectively analyzing resource production. We 
instead focused on state and local tax revenues (n=9) and 
oil and gas related jobs (n=13) as common measures of eco-
nomic impact.
This design allows comparison of the environmental and 
economic impact indicators for a project at three stages. To 
determine whether and when NEPA influences these indica-
tors, we compared the draft EIS proposed action, the final 
EIS agency preferred action, and the ROD selected action. 
We used single-tailed paired t-tests to determine whether 
impacts changed significantly throughout the process.35 The 
paired t-test is appropriate because we are comparing data 
from the same EISs but at different stages of the process—
the draft EIS, final EIS, and ROD.36 Pairing helped reduce 
the variance in the results caused by different initial project 
34. deWitt & deWitt, How Long Does It Take?, supra note 22, at 165.
35. The single-tail reflects our initial hypothesis that NEPA would reduce environ-
mental impacts and economic benefits. See generally Dawn Hawkins, Biomea-
surement: A Student’s Guide to Biostatistics 80 (3d ed. 2014).
36. See id. at 143.
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size. The single-tail reflects our initial hypothesis that NEPA 
would reduce environmental impacts and economic benefits. 
To better describe when project changes occur in the pro-
cess, we calculated the percentage of the total reduction that 
occurred for each impact at the final EIS and ROD stage.
We also sought to determine how the number of alter-
natives affected environmental impact reduction. First, we 
conducted a regression analysis to determine whether any of 
the initially proposed impact factors predicted the number of 
alternatives considered by the agency. Second, we conducted 
a regression analysis to determine whether the number of 
alternatives considered predicted impact reductions.
To determine whether EISs with more alternatives resulted 
in significantly higher impact reduction than EISs with less 
alternatives, O&G EISs were separated into two groups—the 
More Alternatives Group and the Fewer Alternatives Group. 
First, we determined the average number of alternatives con-
sidered in the thirteen final EISs. Next, we created one group 
for EISs that considered the average number of alternatives or 
more and a second group that considered less than the aver-
age. We then determined the total reduction for each impact, 
as measured by the difference in an impact between the draft 
EIS and the ROD, for each of the two groups. Lastly, we 
tested whether the More Alternatives Group resulted in a 
statistically significant difference in impact reduction using 
single-tailed t-tests.37 We also calculated impact reduction 
as a percentage of the initial draft EIS impact measure. We 
include percentage information because of the potential rela-
tionship between the size of initial draft EIS impacts and the 
number of alternatives considered.38
We selected our impact metrics based on four factors; we 
looked for indicators that: (1) addressed a range of impact 
areas (air, water, land, and economic); (2) were quantified 
using common units of measure or units that could be con-
verted into a common measure; (3) were utilized in all or 
almost all of the EISs; and (4) provided a balance between 
37. The single-tailed t-tests reflect our initial hypothesis that more alternatives will 
result in greater impact reductions.
38. If the number of alternatives considered is positively related to the initial im-
pacts in the draft EIS, then we would expect agencies to consider fewer alterna-
tives for projects with smaller impacts and more alternatives for projects with 
larger impacts. In this case, any impact reduction difference between our two 
groups might have been caused by differences in initial impacts. For example, 
the More Alternatives Group may have greater gross impact reduction relative 
to the Fewer Alternatives Group simply because there were more initial im-
pacts. We use percentage reduction purely as a descriptive statistic, as percent-
age reduction partially controls for the confounding variable of initial impact 
size by showing impact reduction as a proportion of the initial impact. We did 
not test for statistical significance using our percent change values because of 
problems inherent to statistical analysis of percentages. See Andrew J. Vickers, 
The Use of Percentage Change From Baseline as an Outcome in a Controlled Trial 
Is Statistically Inefficient: A Simulation Study, 1 BMC Med. Res. Methodol-
ogy 1, 5 (2001) (suggesting the use of an Analysis of Covariance model and 
cautioning that “[p]ercentage change from baseline should therefore not be 
used in statistical analysis”). Because of our low sample size and unequal sam-
ples between groups (one group had a sample size of four and the other group 
nine), an Analysis of Covariance was inappropriate for our data. See generally 
Robert J. Grissom & Jon J. Kim, Effect Sizes for Research: Univariate 
and Multivariate Analysis 352 (2d ed. 2012) (stating Analysis of Covari-
ance is generally inappropriate for unequal sample sizes); Marjorie A. Pett, 
Nonparamtetric Statistics for Health Care Research: Statistics for 
Small Sample Sizes and Unusual Distributions 56 (1997) (stating that 
unequal and small sample sizes render some statistical analysis impossible).
indicators that are subject to independent statutory or regula-
tory mandates to minimize impacts and indicators that are 
not independently regulated. The fourth criteria is important 
in determining whether impacts between these two groups 
were reduced at similar rates. This, in turn, provides insight 
into the driving factors behind impact reduction.
The amount of water utilized and surface disturbance are 
used as broad indicators of environmental impact. Water use, 
however, may understate efforts to reduce water consump-
tion, as efficiency improvements may be offset by water used 
for directional drilling and improved hydraulic fracturing 
which, as explained below, may lead to large reductions in 
surface disturbance. Such tradeoffs are inherent in the NEPA 
decision-making process, where reducing impacts to sensitive 
resources may necessitate an increase in impacts elsewhere. 
We distinguish between temporary and permanent impacts 
to maintain consistency with EIS disclosures. We track wet-
land disturbance because of its universality in EIS disclo-
sures, and because the Clean Water Act requires the Army 
Corps of Engineers, which permits wetland disturbance, to 
approve the least damaging practicable alternative.39 Com-
paring changes to surface disturbance against changes in 
wetland disturbance may therefore provide some insight into 
the comparative effect of NEPA and section 404 of the Clean 
Water Act.
We track job creation and tax revenue generation in order 
to assess the relationship between reductions in environmen-
tal impact and changes in economic benefits. We assume that 
wells will produce similar volumes of hydrocarbons, and that 
the number of wells can therefore also be used as an indica-
tor of potential economic benefits. We track the number of 
well pads, miles of road, and miles of pipeline as indicators 
of surface impact because the maturation of directional drill-
ing and hydraulic fracturing technologies may allow multiple 
39. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a) (2014).
Table 1 
Impact Metrics
Number of wells and well pads










Miles of road and pipeline constructed
Volume of water used
Volume of oil and natural gas produced*
Amount of tax revenue generated by state and local governments
Number of jobs created
Project cost*
* Metrics that were not analyzed statistically because of sample size 
constraints
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wells to be drilled from a single pad. This, in turn, could 
drive a reduction in surface disturbance. Comparing changes 
in the number of wells and well pads may provide some 
insight into whether impact reduction is driven by NEPA or 
other factors.
Air emissions were disclosed in almost all EISs, provid-
ing a suite of common impact reduction indicators. Some 
criteria pollutants, however, have a higher importance in the 
O&G context. Based on modeling for the Greater Natural 
Buttes EIS, for example, emissions of particulate matter less 
than 10 µm in diameter (“PM10”) would increase by 171% to 
449% depending on the amount of development approved.40 
Emission of nitrogen oxides (“NOx”), by comparison, would 
increase by just 21% to 46%.41 While the change in PM10 
dramatically outpaces changes in NOx emissions, NOx 
emissions are generally a higher concern for regulators. The 
Intermountain West has traditionally had very good air qual-
ity, and particulate levels are generally well below National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”). Mountain val-
leys experiencing O&G development, however, are frequently 
struggling with ozone (“O3”) readings exceeding NAAQS.42 
Minimizing tropospheric O3 formation necessitates reducing 
emissions of the chemicals that react with sunlight to form 
O3. NOx is an important O3 precursor and, therefore, rep-
resents the more important indicator, at least with respect 
to Clean Air Act43 compliance.44 Emission controls used to 
address NOx emissions may provide a secondary benefit by 
reducing emissions of other criteria pollutants.
III. Theory
Our first hypothesis, based on informal review of numer-
ous NEPA documents, is that the proposed action is likely 
to undergo modification throughout the NEPA process, and 
that final approvals are likely to authorize a level of impact 
that is lower than initially proposed. We test this hypoth-
esis by comparing predictions of quantifiable environmental 
indicators at multiple points during the NEPA process and 
quantifying how these indicators change over time.
Our second hypothesis, in light of criticisms of NEPA 
compliance’s negative impact on project cost and feasibil-
ity, is that reductions in environmental impact will come at 
a heavy economic cost, as measured in changes to capital 
cost, employment, and tax revenue generation. We test this 
hypothesis by tracking changes to quantifiable economic 
indicators throughout the NEPA process and comparing 
those changes to changes in environmental impacts.
40. Bureau of Land Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Greater Natural 
Buttes Final Environmental Impact Statement, App. G at ES-3 (2012).
41. Id.
42. Peter M. Edwards et al., High Winter Ozone Pollution From Carbonyl Photosyn-
thesis in an Oil and Gas Basin, 514 Nature 351, 351–54 (2014); Marco Ro-
driguez et al., Regional Impacts of Oil and Gas Development on Ozone Formation 
in the Western United States, 59 J. Air & Waste Mgmt. Ass’n 1111, 1111–18 
(2009).
43. Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963) (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2012)).
44. Volatile organic compounds combine with NOx to form O3, but were not ad-
dressed because of inconsistent disclosure across O&G projects.
Our third hypothesis is that impact reductions will pre-
dominantly occur between the draft and final EIS. We test 
this hypothesis by comparing changes in environmental 
impact between draft and final EISs and the ROD.
Our fourth hypothesis, in light of NEPA’s procedural 
mandate, is that other laws will drive the majority of impact 
reductions. We test this hypothesis by comparing environ-
mental impact reductions for indicators that are subject to 
independent statutory or regulatory mandates to reduce 
emissions or impact to indicators that are subject to no such 
independent mandate.
Our fifth hypothesis is that EISs that consider more alter-
natives will result in greater environmental impact reduction. 
This hypothesis recognizes that alternatives are considered 
the “heart of the environmental impact statement”45 and 
Congress intended “that consideration of alternatives, com-
bined with mandatory findings regarding the environmental 
cost of each, would motivate agencies to take greater interest 
in less-harmful options.”46 We test this hypothesis by divid-
ing EISs into two groups, based on the number of alternatives 
considered, and comparing the amount of impact reduction 
that occurred for each group.
IV. Results
A. EIS Preparation Time
Between 1998 and 2007, deWitt and deWitt (2008) reported 
that federal agencies took, on average, 1227 days to proceed 
from NOI to final EIS.47 While deWitt and deWitt (2008) 
did not provide completion time for BLM EISs, they did 
note that the U.S. Forest Service proceeded faster than its 
sister agencies, averaging 990 days from NOI to final EIS.48 
Both figures include the time to complete a supplemental EIS 
where supplementation was required. As deWitt and deWitt 
(2013) reported subsequently, EIS preparation time increased 
by a rate of 19.9 days annually from 2007 through 2010, 
and BLM’s “non-planning” EISs required an average of 1421 
days to proceed from NOI to final EIS, though this does not 
appear to reflect time required to complete required supple-
mental EISs, if any.49
We found that preparation of O&G EISs can take longer 
than other EISs. The time taken to complete an O&G EIS, 
as measured from the NOI to final EIS, averages 1553.1 days 
(range = 980 to 2313 days), or 1617.9 days (range = 1057 to 
2556 days) when measured from NOI to the ROD. We also 
found that it takes longer to prepare a draft EIS (an average 
of 990.5 days, measured as the time between NOI and draft 
45. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (2014).
46. James Allen, NEPA Alternatives Analysis: The Evolving Exclusion of Remote and 
Speculative Alternatives, 25 J. Land Res. & Envtl. L. 287, 292 (2005) (citing 
115 Cong. Rec. 40,416 (1969) (statement of Senator Jackson accompanying 
NEPA’s conference committee report)).
47. deWitt & deWitt, How Long Does It Take?, supra note 22, at 168.
48. Id.
49. deWitt & deWitt, Preparation Times, supra note 22, at 128. deWitt & deWitt 
describe “non-planning” EISs as those completed for purposes other than gen-
eral resource management plans or national and regional planning. See id.
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Table 2 





(% Reduction of Initial Value)
Change Draft to Final 
EIS 
(% of Total Change)
Change Final EIS to 
ROD 
(% of Total Change)
Total 
Change 
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EIS), than to go from a draft EIS to the ROD (627.4 days 
on average).
B. NEPA Process and Impact Reduction
Consistent reductions in environmental and economic mea-
sures occur as projects progress from the draft EIS to the 
final EIS and then to the ROD. The majority of reductions 
occurred between the draft EIS and the final EIS, with rela-
tively minor reductions occurring between the final EIS and 
ROD. A summary of results is shown in Table 2.
C. Alternatives Considered
The number of alternatives considered during the draft 
EIS and final EIS ranged from two to ten and two to eight 
respectively. The mean number of alternatives considered 
during the draft EIS was 4.6 and the final EIS was 4.3. The 
difference in means between draft EISs and final EISs can be 
attributed to one project. The draft EIS for the Jonah Infill 
Project considered ten alternatives, but five of these alterna-
tives were not carried forward into the final EIS because the 
BLM concluded that they were duplicative of the remaining 
alternatives.50
D. Relationship Between Alternatives Considered and 
Proposed Project Impacts
Of the impact factors, acres of proposed temporary surface 
disturbance was the best predictor of the number of alter-
natives considered (r(12)=0.51, p=0.0058). This factor was 
followed by the proposed number of wells (r(12)=0.49, 
p=0.0073), proposed acres of permanent surface disturbance 
(r(12)=0.48, p=0.0082), and proposed number of well pads 
(r(12)=0.47, p=0.0098). In contrast, the number of alterna-
tives was not a statistically significant predictor of the amount 
of reduction for any of the impact measures.
E. Alternatives and Impact Reduction
To better assess the relationship between the number of alter-
natives and impact reduction, we separated the EISs into two 
groups based on the number of alternatives considered in the 
final EIS51: (1) those that considered four or more alternatives 
(“More Alternatives Group”) and (2) those that considered 
three or fewer alternatives (“Fewer Alternatives Group”). This 
resulted in four EISs in the Fewer Alternatives Group and 
nine EISs in the More Alternatives Group.
The More Alternatives Group had greater impact reduc-
tions than the Fewer Alternative Group for eleven of the 
50. Bureau of Land Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Final Environmen-
tal Impact Statement: Jonah Infill Drilling Project Sublette County, 
Wyoming 2-7 to 2-8 (2006).
51. We use the number of alternatives considered in the final EIS because the mean 
number of alternatives considered decreased from the draft EIS to the final 
EIS in our sample. Consequently, the alternatives considered at the final EIS 
stage are a better representation of the options available to the agency decision-
maker when making the final agency decision at the ROD stage.
thirteen environmental impacts. Six of these differences were 
statistically significant. The Fewer Alternatives Group had 
lower impact reductions for the two economic metrics; how-
ever, neither of these differences was statistically significant. 
We also calculated the percent reduction for each impact 
by group, which was accomplished by dividing the impact 
reduction for each value by the initial value of the impact. 
We include this value for descriptive purposes, as there is 
an apparent relationship between initial impact levels and 
the number of alternatives considered. A summary of these 
results is shown in Table 3.
EISs that considered fewer alternatives were completed on 
average 312.1 days sooner than those that considered more 
alternatives. EISs that considered fewer alternatives took a 
mean of 1408.5 days to complete. EISs that considered more 
alternatives took a mean of 1720.6 days.
V. Discussion
A. EIS Preparation Time
Based on our analysis and data from deWitt and deWitt 
(2008 & 2013), it appears that O&G EISs take longer to pre-
pare than EISs for other types of projects. While this analy-
sis does not indicate why O&G EISs take longer, we posit 
that the size, complexity, and public attention associated 
with these projects drives longer completion times. Agency 
staffing levels may also play an important role in increasing 
preparation time.
In our study, one of thirteen EISs (7.7%) required supple-
mentation between issuance of the draft EIS and the ROD. 
This result is consistent with deWitt and deWitt’s (2008) 
finding that 6.2% of EISs required pre-ROD supplementa-
tion.52 The deWitt and deWitt (2008) report also found that 
publication of a supplemental EIS added an average of 835 
days to the time required for NEPA compliance.53
With O&G EISs taking an average of over 4.4 years to 
proceed from NOI to ROD, frustration at the time and 
expense involved in NEPA compliance is not surprising. 
While legislative proposals to establish deadlines for EIS 
completion appear responsive to these concerns, they 
could produce the opposite result. If an accelerated time-
line results in NEPA documentation that fails to satisfy 
the “hard look” requirement, supplementation will be 
required, and the expense and time involved in complet-
ing a supplement—almost 2.3 additional years according 
to deWitt and deWitt’s (2008) analysis54—may outweigh 
the benefit resulting from expedited NEPA. Increased 
emphasis on NEPA’s mandate to “deemphasize insignifi-
cant issues”55 may have a more lasting impact, as may col-
laborative approaches to NEPA that reduce the likelihood 
of litigation-driven EIS supplementation.
52. deWitt & deWitt, How Long Does It Take?, supra note 22, at 171.
53. Id. at 170.
54. Id. at 169–70.
55. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.4(f ), (g) (2014).
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B. Environmental Impact Reduction
EISs appear to reduce environmental impacts. Impacts to 
all measured elements evidenced a reduction in impacts 
between draft EIS and ROD. On a percentage basis, reduc-
tions were largest for the air quality parameters PM10, PM2.5, 
and NOx, which all saw initial impacts reduced by 23% or 
more between draft EIS and ROD. Reductions in PM10 are 
important because O&G development is anticipated to result 
in a major increase in emission of these larger particulates.56 
Reductions in NOx are important because NOx are chemical 
precursors of O3, and some valleys in Utah and Wyoming 
are experiencing very high O3 levels that have been attrib-
uted to O&G development.57 Impacts to wetlands were also 
reduced by more than 30% between draft EIS and ROD. 
Each of these elements is subject to independent action-forc-
ing regulation, perhaps indicating that impact reductions are 
56. Bureau of Land Mgmt., supra note 40.
57. Edwards et al., supra note 42; Rodriguez et al., supra note 42.
attributable to compliance with environmental laws other 
than NEPA.
Sulfur dioxide (“SO2”) and carbon monoxide (“CO”) are 
also subject to independent action-forcing regulation, but 
both experienced statistically insignificant and compara-
tively minor impact reductions (initial impacts reduced by 
5%). Regulation alone, therefore, does not appear to guar-
antee significant impact reduction. Lower rates of emission 
reduction may indicate that less effort is expended on reduc-
ing emission of these pollutants because the project areas 
analyzed in these EISs appear to have ambient SO2 and CO 
levels that are well below NAAQS.58 Other potential alter-
nate explanations are discussed below.59
A reduction of less than 1% in the number of wells drilled 
resulted in 13% reductions in permanent surface disturbance 
and 10% reductions in temporary surface disturbance. Both 
58. Bureau of Land Mgmt., supra note 40, at 2-3, 2-4, 2-7 (discussing back-
ground concentrations air quality standards).
59. See infra Part V.D.
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reductions were statistically significant, indicating meaning-
ful reductions may occur without a hard regulatory mandate 
such as the Clean Air Act or Clean Water Act. These impact 
reductions are consistent with arguments that NEPA is effec-
tive in its goal of encouraging agencies to take a hard look at 
feasible alternatives to the proposed action and that reduc-
tions in impact can be achieved at a comparatively small eco-
nomic cost.
We anticipated that the concurrent maturation of direc-
tional drilling and hydraulic fracturing techniques would 
result in a reduction in surface disturbance. In contrast to 
vertical wells which tap only the hydrocarbons directly below 
the well, directional drilling allows operators to drill non-ver-
tical wells that more efficiently drain hydrocarbons located in 
narrow horizontal formations that may be thousands of feet 
from the well pad.60 Hydraulic fracturing injects liquids into 
hydrocarbon bearing formations in order to increase forma-
tion permeability and the rate of hydrocarbon recovery.61 
The co-utilization of these technologies would allow devel-
opers to locate multiple wells from a single well pad, and in 
so doing, reduce the total number of well pads developed. 
The reduction in well pads would equate to a reduction in 
surface disturbance.62 The number of well pads did decrease 
by 8% between draft EIS and ROD, compared to a less than 
1% reduction in the number of wells over that same period, 
which is consistent with a shift towards development of mul-
tiple wells from a single pad. The reduction in number of 
well pads also likely contributed to the reduction in road and 
pipeline construction and associated disturbance, because 
fewer pads necessitate a less extensive inter-pad road and util-
ity network.63
C. Impacts on Economic Benefits
As hypothesized, environmental impact reduction appears to 
come at an economic cost, though that cost is lower than we 
anticipated. Both job creation and state and local tax revenue 
declined between the draft EIS and ROD; however, declines 
in impacts to key environmental indicators occurred at 
higher rates than declines in economic indicators. Projected 
job growth declined by a statistically significant 3% between 
the draft EIS and the ROD. However, declines in job growth 
occurred at a lower rate than reductions in eleven of thirteen 
environmental impacts, nine of which experienced statisti-
cally significant reductions. While reductions in state and 
local tax revenue generation declined by 6% between draft 
EIS and ROD, a lower rate than seven of thirteen environ-
60. See Bureau of Land Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Northern San 
Juan Basin Coal Bed Methane Final Environmental Impact Statement 
2-4 (2006) (discussing alternate drilling technologies); see also Oil Field Glos-
sary, Schlumerger, http://www.glossary.oilfield.slb.com/ (last visited Sept. 
28, 2015).
61. Cong. Research Serv., R40894, Unconventional Gas Shales: Develop-
ment, Technology, and Policy Issues 21–25 (2009); see Oil Field Glossary, 
supra note 60.
62. Dan Arthur & David Cornue, Technologies Reduce Pad Size, Waste, Am. Oil 
& Gas Rep., Aug. 2010; see Bureau of Land Mgmt., supra note 40 at 2-32 
(showing reduced surface disturbance under alternative utilizing directional 
drilling and multiple wells from a single well pad). 
63. Id.
mental indicators, declines in tax revenue were not statisti-
cally significant.
With four environmental indicators experiencing more 
than 20% reductions in impacts and nine environmental 
indicators experiencing statistically significant reductions, it 
appears that environmental impacts can be reduced through 
the NEPA process without driving a commensurate reduc-
tion in economic benefits. Furthermore, reductions in pol-
lution emissions may provide an indirect economic benefit 
by reducing absenteeism and health care costs.64 Also absent 
from our analysis of economic impacts are the potential 
benefits to recreational use of public lands that result from 
reduced well pad density.
D. Impact Reduction and Causation
Researchers speculate that the NEPA process itself can drive 
impact reduction through several mechanisms. For example, 
NEPA forces a scientific analysis of a proposed action, and 
this analysis alone could indirectly lead to impact reduc-
tion.65 The “internal reform” model suggests that NEPA 
forces changes in agency priorities, personnel, and process 
that result in more sustainable decision-making.66 In con-
trast, the “external reform” model contends that the increased 
transparency and public involvement associated with NEPA 
may result in more sustainable decision-making.67 The inter-
nal and external models may work together to provide syn-
ergistic benefits.
Our results indicate that a statistically significant reduc-
tion in project impacts occurs over the course of the NEPA 
process, and the largest reduction—80% of total impact 
reduction across all elements—occurs between publication 
of the draft EIS and final EIS. The reduction in impacts 
could be attributed to NEPA-related mechanisms, interven-
ing variables, or a combination of both. Possible intervening 
64. See, e.g., National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 78 
Fed. Reg. 3086, 3089 (proposed Jan. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
§ 50.18) (estimating the economic benefit derived from revised PM2.5 stan-
dards at $3.6 to $9.1 million).
65. Cashmore et al., supra note 10, at 304–05.
66. Robert V. Bartlett, The Rationality and Logic of NEPA Revisited, in Environ-
mental Policy and NEPA 55–56 (Ray Clark & Larry Canter eds., 1997). 
Prior to NEPA’s enactment, agencies were professionally homogeneous; for 
example, the U.S. Forest Service was predominantly staffed by foresters and 
the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation with engineers. This homogeneity resulted 
in agencies that were less sensitive to environmental impacts outside of their 
realm of expertise. After NEPA was enacted, agencies were forced to “diversify 
their staffs so that specialists could take responsibility for preparing EISs. . . .” 
Paul J. Culhane, NEPA’s Impacts on Federal Agencies, Anticipated and Unantici-
pated, 20 Envtl. L. 681, 691 (1990). The most obvious example, described 
by Friesema and Culhane, is the U.S. Forest Service using “subtle and not so 
subtle techniques” to generate enough public pressure to justify severe restric-
tions and project modifications during the NEPA process. H. Paul Friesema 
& Paul J. Culhane, Social Impacts, Politics, and the Environmental Impact State-
ment Process, 16 Nat. Res. J. 339, 354–55 (1976).
67. Bartlett, supra note 66; see Culhane, supra note 66, at 692 (“[NEPA provided] a 
new opportunity for environmental groups, concerned citizens, and individual 
scientists to influence agency decisions. Before NEPA, these groups were, at 
best, underrepresented in agencies’ constituency networks.”) (concluding that 
NEPA encourages an agency to consider ramifications of a decision on “[their] 
public reputation and political capital; costly and time-consuming lawsuits; 
disciplining congressional responses including budget reductions, legislative 
amendments, or oversight hearings; and disciplining personnel, policy, or bud-
get moves by the White House”).
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causes include: (1) impact reduction occurring during earlier 
NEPA decisions, (2) gaming of the NEPA process, (3) legal 
requirements contained in other environmental laws, and 
(4) intervening economic or technological factors. These are 
addressed in turn.
1. Impact Reduction During Antecedent NEPA
O&G development occurring on federal land necessitates 
a series of federal decisions preceding the O&G EIS, each 
of which may trigger NEPA and provide an opportunity for 
impact reduction.68 Because this Article addresses only the 
final phase of a multi-tiered federal decision-making process, 
it may understate total impact reductions.
O&G leasing and development decisions occur against 
the backdrop of decisions contained in the BLM’s Resource 
Management Plans (“RMPs”).69 RMPs contain broad-scale 
decisions, such as which areas will be open or closed to min-
eral development, and cover a planning area that can be sev-
eral million acres in size. RMPs are invariably major federal 
actions with significant environmental impact and, there-
fore, require EIS preparation, which subjects them to the 
kinds of iterative impact reductions already discussed.70 For 
areas that are open to development, RMPs typically indicate 
which surface use stipulations will apply.71
The surface use stipulations contained in RMPs fall into 
four general categories. Standard lease terms and condi-
tions allow the BLM to require operators to move surface 
disturbing activity by up to 200 meters or limit activity by 
up to 60 days.72 The BLM can impose longer timing limits 
or broader surface use restrictions, under “timing limits” or 
“conditional surface use” stipulations, as needed to protect 
sensitive resources.73 Where timing limits and conditional 
surface use stipulations are insufficient, the BLM can impose 
a “no surface use” stipulation, which precludes surface dis-
turbing activities while allowing operators to access hydro-
carbons from horizontal wells drilled outside the no surface 
occupancy area.74 The BLM can also choose to forego leasing 
entirely.75 Surface use stipulations contained in RMPs provide 
the BLM with a powerful tool to protect sensitive resources, 
and significant environmental impacts may thus be avoided 
before the O&G development EIS is even considered.
Our analysis looks only at environmental impact reduc-
tion occurring after the BLM determines which lands will be 
open to leasing and, for those lands, which surface use stipu-
lations will apply. Accordingly, our analysis almost certainly 
under-reports total impact reduction occurring through all 
phases of the NEPA process. Research investigating impact 
reduction occurring as part of the antecedent NEPA analysis 
for RMP decisions is underway and will provide additional 
68. See Bureau of Land Mgmt., U.S. Dept. of the Interior, H-1601-1, Land 
Use Planning Handbook 11–13 (2005).
69. Land use plans are required under 43 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (2012).
70. See Bureau of Land Mgmt., supra note 68, at 17, app. C at 23–24.
71. See id. at 13.
72. 43 C.F.R. § 3101.1-2 (2014).
73. See Bureau of Land Mgmt., supra note 68, app. C at 23–24.
74. See id.
75. See id.
insight into the longitudinal relationship between these 
tiered NEPA decisions.76
2. Reductions Driven by Other Environmental 
Laws
The legal test of a NEPA document is not whether it produces 
the least environmentally damaging alternative, but whether 
the lead agency took a “hard look” at the impacts of the pro-
posed action and a reasonable range of alternatives to that 
action.77 In contrast, laws like the Clean Air Act, Clean Water 
Act, and Endangered Species Act require impact avoidance 
and minimization as well as mitigation of unavoidable envi-
ronmental impacts. The Clean Air Act, for example, requires 
employment of the “best available control technology” for 
new major emitting facilities.78 The Clean Water Act’s section 
404(b)(1) guidelines require that “no discharge of dredged or 
fill material shall be permitted if there is a practicable alterna-
tive to the proposed discharge which would have less adverse 
impact on the aquatic ecosystem.”79 Similarly, section 7(a)(2) 
of the Endangered Species Act imposes a duty on federal 
agencies to avoid jeopardizing the continued existence of 
listed species and to avoid adverse modification of designated 
critical habitat.80 It follows that, while NEPA may require a 
public vetting of the environmental consequences of various 
courses of action, other laws could drive impact reduction.
If NEPA’s critics are correct, and NEPA does significantly 
less to advance environmental protection, we would antici-
pate that the impact reductions to environmental attributes 
that are subject to independent action-forcing regulations, 
such as air quality standards, restrictions on dredging or fill-
ing wetlands, or endangered species protections, would far 
outpace the reductions to environmental attributes that are 
uniquely attributable to NEPA. While impact reductions for 
some regulated resources did occur at very high rates when 
compared to unregulated resources, reductions in tempo-
rary and permanent surface disturbance were statistically 
significant and cannot be attributed directly to a regulatory 
mandate to minimize these impacts.81 These findings may 
indicate that NEPA can lead to environmental impact reduc-
tions independent of other environmental laws.
Reductions in air quality impacts, however, are an area 
where reduction appears to be driven heavily by other envi-
ronmental laws. Elevated ground-level O3 levels have been 
discovered in many rural counties that are experiencing 
76. John Ruple & Mark Capone, NEPA, FLPMA, and Impact Reduction: An 
Empirical Assessment of BLM Resource Management Planning in the Inter-
mountain West (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Authors).
77. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983); 
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (2012).
79. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a) (2014).
80. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012).
81. Although not quantified in this study, the Endangered Species Act and con-
sultations with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service appeared to play a relatively 
minor role in surface disturbance reduction. We speculate that this minor role 
in O&G EISs is, in large part, due to (1) habitat avoidance measures called for 
in the RMP, and (2) the avoidance of riparian habitat impacts associated with 
Clean Water Act requirements.
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rapid O&G development,82 raising concern that these areas 
may be designated as non-attainment areas for O3 under the 
Clean Air Act.83 Accordingly, increased emphasis has been 
placed on reducing emissions of O3’s chemical precursors, 
such as volatile organic compounds84 and NOx.85 Such an 
emphasis is consistent with our finding that NOx emission 
reductions were greater than reductions in other criteria pol-
lutants assessed in O&G EISs, with the exception of PM2.5. 
Accordingly, the Clean Air Act, rather than NEPA, may be 
the primary driver in NOx emission reductions. Technolo-
gies deployed to reduce NOx and volatile organic compound 
emissions may also provide some reduction in particulate 
emissions,86 potentially offering partial explanation for 
PM10 and PM2.5 emission reductions. As SO2 is not an O3 
precursor, and SO2 levels are a less significant concern in 
most areas undergoing O&G development,87 the absence 
of significant reductions in SO2 emissions is also consistent 
with this interpretation. However, even if the Clean Air Act 
is the primary driver behind emission reductions, NEPA 
may still play an important role in assessing the viability of 
specific pollution reduction technologies and thereby facili-
tate their deployment.
It therefore appears that NEPA can lead to a statistically 
significant reduction in some environmental impacts, even 
if reductions are not as rapid as those resulting from stat-
utes that include a strong impact avoidance or minimiza-
tion mandate. We hypothesize that NEPA’s disclosure and 
hard look requirements focus agency and public attention 
towards impact reduction, even where hard regulatory trig-
gers do not exist.
3. Gaming NEPA
When negotiating, parties often begin by asking for more 
than they expect to obtain in order to create room for conces-
sions.88 Similarly, strategic NEPA proposal enlargement may 
occur if permittees believe the NEPA process will inevita-
bly result in a reduction in the extent of authorized impacts 
or facilities. Proponents could inflate the initial proposal in 
order to obtain their desired outcome, following anticipated 
82. Samuel Oltsman et al., Anatomy of Wintertime Ozone Associated With Oil and 
Natural Gas Extraction Activity in Wyoming and Utah, 2 Elem. Sci. Anth. 1, 
13 (2014).
83. See Miss. Comm’n on Env’t Quality v. EPA, No. 12-1309, slip op. at 3, 23 
(D.C. Cir. June 2, 2015) (involving numerous consolidated cases challenging 
EPA designation of the Uinta Basin as “unclassifiable” for ozone).
84. Volatile organic compound emissions were not reported consistently in the 
EISs we reviewed.
85. Ground-Level Ozone: Basic Information, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, 
http://www3.epa.gov/airquality/ozonepollution/resources.html (last visited 
Jan. 20, 2015); see also Edwards et al., supra note 42, at 351–55; Rodriguez et 
al., supra note 42.
86. See, e.g., Michael J. Kleemana et al., Control Strategies for the Reduction of Air-
borne Particulate Nitrate in California’s San Joaquin Valley, 39 Atmospheric 
Env’t 5325, 5325–41 (2005) (noting that each gram of NOx emitted locally 
within the San Joaquine Valley produced 0.23–0.31 grams of particulate am-
monium nitrate).
87. See, e.g., Bureau of Land Mgmt, supra note 40, at 2-3, 2-4, 2-7 (showing SO2 
levels are well below NAAQS).
88. See Gary Goodpaster, A Primer on Competitive Bargaining, 1996 J. Dis. Res. 
325, 351, 355 (1996); Richard Birke & Craig R. Fox, Psychological Principles 
in Negotiating Civil Settlements, 4 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 1, 41 (1999).
reductions. Alternatively, permittees may inflate the initial 
proposal so they may later offer to reduce impacts and, by 
doing so, curry favor with the lead agency and the public.
While gaming during the NEPA process has been 
suggested,89 there is little empirical information to indicate 
whether gaming is a common practice. In contrast, gam-
ing by exaggeration or inflation of cost estimates is a docu-
mented industry strategy in Clean Water Act and Clean Air 
Act regulation.90 The result of gaming in these contexts is 
“illusory” impact reductions.91 If gaming of the NEPA pro-
cess does occur, some amount of the impact reduction we 
measured may be illusory.
4. Intervening Economic or Technological Factors
Technology and associated economic factors may change 
over time, making environmentally preferable technologies 
easier to deploy commercially. For example, the matura-
tion and convergence of directional drilling and hydraulic 
fracturing technologies occurred concurrent with the pro-
posals evaluated in our analysis.92 Dramatic increases in 
O&G production are widely attributed to this technological 
maturation and convergence.93 Hydraulic fracturing allows 
operators to greatly increase production, while improvements 
in directional drilling technology allow O&G operators to 
reach laterally for much greater distances.94 This technologi-
cal convergence allows operators to drill multiple wells from 
a single well pad, thereby allowing higher levels of O&G 
production from fewer well pads.95 Our results indicate that 
consolidating wells onto fewer well pads reduced the amount 
of surface disturbance associated with well pads and also the 
amount of roads and pipelines needed to connect these pads 
89. See Robert W. Adler, In Defense of NEPA: The Case of the Legacy Parkway, 26 J. 
Land Res. & Envtl. L. 297, 300 (2006).
90. Ann Powers, Reducing Nitrogen Pollution on Long Island Sound: Is There A Place 
for Pollutant Trading?, 23 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 137, 158 (1998) (“[I]t is obvi-
ous that some of the disparity between estimates and current costs stems from 
inflated estimates used by industry to oppose the program.”); Richard Toshi-
yuki Drury et al., Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles’ 
Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 231, 259 
(1999) (“Pollution trading programs create stronger incentives to manipulate 
the numbers and cheat, because credits that are fraudulently created are still 
worth money.”); Robert V. Percival, Regulatory Evolution and the Future of En-
vironmental Policy, 1997 U. Chi. Legal F. 159, 180 (1997) (“[I]t is in the stra-
tegic interest of regulatory targets to exaggerate prospective costs in an effort 
to avoid regulation.”).
91. Drury et al., supra note 90, 263–64 (1999). On the other side, NEPA cynics 
claim that agencies have learned to game the NEPA process so that results are 
typically decided at the outset, and simply ratified by a well-oiled EIS factory 
in which the right issues are addressed, and the right words are magically in-
voked to survive any judicial review. See Adler, supra note 89.
92. See Cong. Research Serv., supra note 61 at 17–18 (explaining that “[c]om-
bining hydraulic fracturing with directional drilling has opened up production 
of tighter (less permeable) petroleum and natural gas reservoirs, and in particu-
lar, unconventional gas shales”).
93. Timothy Fitzgerald, Frackonomics: Some Economics of Hydraulic Fracturing, 63 
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1337, 1344 (2013).
94. Michael J. Wozniak & Jamie L. Jost, Horizontal Drilling: Why Its Much Better 
to “Lay Down” Than to “Stand Up” and What Is an “18º Azimuth” Anyway?, 57 
Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 6A-1, 6A-11 to 6A-12 (2011).
95. See Robert Keiter & Kristin Lindstrom, Lessons From Nine Mile Canyon: 
Achieving Consensus Over Energy Development on the Public Lands, 57 Rocky 
Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 3-1, 3-20 (2011) (“Originally, [the operator] had planned 
to use traditional extraction techniques of 8 well pads per section, but the new 
technology enabled it to drill 16 or more wells from a single pad.”).
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and convey hydrocarbons to market. Reducing roads and 
pipelines further minimized ground disturbance.
The statistically significant reduction in surface distur-
bance associated with O&G development that we observed 
may, therefore, have more to do with technology maturation 
than NEPA. That said, NEPA undoubtedly creates a forum 
for the public to demand consideration of emerging tech-
nologies and for agencies to evaluate the viability of impact 
reducing technologies. In fact, several EISs included alterna-
tives emphasizing directional drilling and consolidated well 
pads that were developed in response to public comments.96 
It, therefore, appears that NEPA may provide an environ-
mental benefit by hastening the deployment of environmen-
tally preferable technologies.
It is unclear whether O&G operators would have tran-
sitioned to consolidating wells on a single pad as rapidly as 
they have absent NEPA.97 Perhaps comparing the rate of 
emergent technology adoption for projects subject to NEPA 
against the rate of adoption for projects where NEPA does 
not apply (such as projects occurring on state or private land) 
would provide some insight into this question. However, at a 
minimum, we can say that NEPA provided the public with 
an opportunity to evaluate the feasibility of alternative tech-
nology. As such, NEPA represents an important mechanism 
for accelerating adoption of emergent technologies that result 
in reduced environmental impacts.
E. Alternatives and Impact Reduction
Given our limited sample size (n=13),98 our results regard-
ing the effect of the number of alternatives considered on 
impact reductions should be considered preliminary in 
nature. However, our analysis indicates that consideration 
of four or more alternatives does result in greater impact 
96. Bureau of Land Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Record of Deci-
sion for the Gasco Energy Inc. Uinta Basin Natural Gas Development 
Project 11–12 (2012) (“[The Agency Preferred Alternative] was developed 
after the public comment period on the Draft EIS . . . . Surface impacts were 
reduced by requiring directional drilling . . . . [T]his alternative was developed 
as a result of public comment  .  .  .  .”); Letter from Bill Barrett Corporation, 
to U.S. Bureau of Land Management (Feb. 24, 2010) (on file with author) 
(explaining that, in part because of “a significant amount of time discussing 
the project with other stakeholders and reviewing public comment[,]” the 
company decided to reduce the number of wells and well pads in a new alter-
native); Bureau of Land Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Northern 
San Juan Basin Coal Bed Methane Project Record of Decision 3 (2007) 
(“I am selecting Alternative 7, with the identified modifications and required 
mitigation measures, because it most effectively addresses the issues surfaced dur-
ing the extensive public input process while honoring the lease rights held by the 
proponents.”) (emphasis added).
97. Operators would likely prefer to use traditional vertical wells under most cir-
cumstances as “[t]here is lower cost and risk by drilling vertically. Reserves 
often can be captured adequately with vertical wellbores. When pumping is 
required to produce the oil, maintenance costs are lower in vertical wellbores 
[as compared to directional].” Bureau of Land Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of the 
Interior, Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Final San 
Juan National Forest and Proposed Tres Rios Field Office Land and 
Resource Management Plan 491 (2015) (“Directional drilling techniques 
can be particularly helpful in environmentally sensitive or culturally rich areas 
. . . [however] these benefits are offset by the incremental increase in both cost 
(approximately 20%) and operational risk associated with drilling these more 
complex boreholes.”).
98. As mentioned, the More Alternatives Group had nine EISs and the Fewer Al-
ternatives Group had four EISs. Supra Part IV.E.
reduction than consideration of three or fewer alternatives. 
The More Alternatives Group had statistically significant 
greater reductions in environmental impact than the Fewer 
Alternatives Group for six of the thirteen environmental 
indicators. Despite the preliminary nature of this finding, 
it appears that evaluating more than three alternatives can 
improve impact reduction. Nevertheless, these reduced envi-
ronmental impacts appear to come at the cost of increased 
EIS preparation time, with EISs considering three or fewer 
alternatives being completed 312 days sooner than those 
that considered four or more alternatives.
These reductions appear to be independent of the relation-
ship we observed between project magnitude and number of 
alternatives considered. Our results indicate that the num-
ber of alternatives considered by an agency is related to the 
magnitude of the proposed project. For example, agencies are 
likely to consider more alternatives for projects with a greater 
potential for surface impacts. Based on this relationship, one 
might conclude that differences in impact reduction are sim-
ply the result of different project sizes, meaning the More and 
Fewer Alternatives groups are equally effective at reducing 
impacts but the overall impact reduction is different because 
there are more impacts to be reduced for the More Alterna-
tives Group.
However, if this conflation were true and initial project 
size, not the number of alternatives considered, was the true 
cause of the difference in impact reduction, then we would 
expect the percentage of total impact reduction for the More 
and Fewer Alternatives Groups to be roughly equal. However, 
impact reductions for the More Alternatives Group greatly 
exceeded those of the Fewer Alternatives Group, as measured 
by the percentage of the initial proposed impact, for seven of 
the thirteen impacts, with one impact being roughly equal. 
Thus, initial project size alone does not explain the difference 
in impact reduction between the two groups.
Although preliminary, these results are intuitive. Consid-
eration of more alternatives indicates a more thorough review. 
When an agency considers three or fewer alternatives, the 
agency may have insufficient information regarding available 
options and the associated tradeoffs.
One may argue that some EISs involve straightforward 
proposals that do not necessitate a significant range of alter-
natives. However, as discussed,99 since EISs are required for 
less than 1% of projects evaluated under NEPA,100 and as 
these projects have already been found to have impacts that 
are environmentally significant,101 there appears to be little 
reason to severely restrict the scope of alternatives in an EIS.
VI. Conclusions and Recommendations
Based on our review of O&G projects within a four-state 
region, NEPA compliance does appear to produce final deci-
sions that are substantially less impactful on the environment 
when compared to initially proposed projects. Impact reduc-
99. Daniel R. Mandelker, NEPA Law and Litigation § 11:1 (2d ed. 2014).
100. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 6, at 8.
101. See 43 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.3 (2014).
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tions occur primarily between the draft EIS and final EIS 
stages of the NEPA process, with minor reductions occurring 
between the final EIS and ROD. While reductions may be 
partially attributable to legal requirements external to NEPA 
(such as Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, or Endangered 
Species Act requirements or intervening economic and tech-
nological factors), external factors alone do not adequately 
explain impact reductions.
This Article also found that the number of alternatives 
considered within an EIS affects both the magnitude and 
proportion of impact reduction. EISs that consider a broader 
range of alternatives are more effective at reducing environ-
mental impacts. We, therefore, encourage federal agencies 
to include a robust range of alternatives in their EISs and 
to use the alternative development and evaluation process to 
determine whether emergent technologies can reduce envi-
ronmental impacts without severely impacting project cost 
or viability.
In light of these findings, we also urge caution when con-
sidering proposals to streamline the EIS process, because 
streamlining efforts may reduce NEPA’s tangible benefits. 
We note that aggressive EIS timelines could, at least in 
theory, hinder the impact analysis and, in so doing, make 
EISs more susceptible to legal challenge. Court-ordered EIS 
supplementation would almost certainly negate any benefits 
of expediting proposals.
We hope that this first attempt at quantifying the environ-
mental efficacy of NEPA will engender a productive debate 
on the question of NEPA reform. We acknowledge that the 
limited scope of our analysis may restrict the applicability of 
our results and the generalizations that can be drawn from 
them. However, even assuming that intervening consider-
ations are significant contributing causal factors in NEPA 
impact reduction, there is little doubt that NEPA leads to 
less environmentally harmful decisions and that it does so 
without a dramatic reduction in economic benefits.
